

Senate Armed Services Committee

Both Houses Demand Probe Of Pueblo

The Pueblo case continues to make waves on Capitol Hill and seems headed toward further congressional scrutiny when the formal Navy inquiry ends in California.

Calls for Armed Services Committee hearings came from both the House and the Senate yesterday, along with some advice for President Nixon on administrative reforms for spy ship procedures.

The Senate Foreign Relations committee also may reopen its own Pueblo investigation, begun last year.

Sen. Stephen Young, D-Ohio, blaming the CIA for the whole "sordid affair," said he will ask the Senate Armed Services Committee to lead a full survey of the Pueblo case from its inception to the "disgraceful moment" when Navy Comdr. Lloyd M. Bucher surrendered to North Korean gunboats without a fight.

"Director (Richard) Helms of the CIA, replete with a sad record of blunders such as the U-2 affair and the poorly planned Bay of Pigs operation, must bear the responsibility for the Pueblo disgraceful disaster," Young said. "It is evident that this was an unnecessary and ill-timed operation from the outset."

Young urged Congress and the President to "straighten out" the CIA.

As for administrative changes, Young suggested the United States should follow the lead of the Soviet Union and completely separate intelligence activities from the regular Navy. He said Soviet spy ships are disguised as fishing trawlers but without the nets.

Young said, men these spy ships should be discharged from the Navy or encouraged to resign.

On the House side, Rep. John Myers, R-Ind., asked Armed Services Committee Chairman Mendel Rivers to lead his own "complete review" of the Pueblo case.

"Congress has a responsibility to the people of this nation," Myers said, "to know all the facts in this case so they can judge for themselves who is responsible for the unfortunate blunder."

Rivers declined immediate comment; House committees won't be formally organized for the new Congress until later this week. But he was quoted earlier as saying he would welcome a Pueblo investigation.

One note of caution was heard. Sen. Carl T. Curtis, R-Neb., said he hopes Congress will not subject Bucher to "repetitious" and unnecessary investigations.

Rep. Johnathan Bingham, D-N.Y., urged Nixon, meanwhile, to revise the code of conduct for captured military men. Instead of limiting a man's responses to "name, rank and service number," Bingham said any soldier should be permitted to sign or make statements or confessions that do not contain factual information useful to the enemy.

Bingham, a former ambassador to the United Nations, said the United States then should announce that no statement made by a captured American military person can be believed.

Senate Probe Weighed in Pueblo Case

Sen. John Stennis (D.Miss.) indicated yesterday that the Senate Armed Services Committee which he heads will investigate the capture of the intelligence ship Pueblo after a Navy court completes its inquiry.

He said that while no final decision has been made he has informed Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird that a Senate inquiry is likely and asked that witnesses be kept readily available.

Stennis said in a Senate statement that the Navy inquiry is limited in scope to matters wholly within the jurisdiction of the Navy, but that other branches of the Department of Defense shared in responsibility for policies and conditions under which the ship operated. All the facts must be known to learn why the ship was captured and how to prevent another such incident, said Stennis.

Adm. John J. Hyland, Pacific fleet commander who convened the court of inquiry now taking testimony in Coronado, Calif., said that "if the House and Senate feel they have to look into it, that is certainly their prerogative."

The court heard testimony in closed session yesterday from three Navy captains who were on duty when the Pueblo was captured a year ago by North Korea. They were Capt. James W. Parson, a security officer in Japan; Capt. Everett B. Gladding, now retired but formerly on Hyland's staff; and Capt. John L. Marocchi, an intelligence officer with the Pacific fleet.

North Korea contended and the Pueblo's captain, Cmdr. Lloyd M. Bucher, denied that the ship was in North Korean waters when seized. Bucher told the court of inquiry that he had requested and been refused the means to quickly destroy secret equipment on his ship.

Stennis Asks Pentagon for War 'Facts'

United Press International

Chairman John C. Stennis (D-Miss.) of the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday asked the Pentagon to provide Congress with facts—not "rosy pictures"—on the Vietnam war.

Stennis' complaint about lack of accurate information came during confirmation hearings for G. Warren Nutter, appointed as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

He urged Nutter to give the committee "facts" on the Vietnam war when he is called to testify during his term of office.

"We've gone along for years—and that's plural, years—with the same rosy, rosy pictures," Stennis said.

The chairman said the overly optimistic outlook of many Congressional committees applied to "the military situation as a whole" and cited reports given on the military capacity of the South Vietnamese Army.

Stennis said Defense officials who made the presentations were either "badly mistaken" or the information was "somebody's dream."

Nutter, citing the negotiations in Paris and the fact he has not assumed office, declined to be drawn into a discussion of the war. He said it would be irresponsible for him to do so at this time.

SENATE UNIT VOTES SAFEGUARD, 10-7, HERALDING FIGHT

Sharp Split in Committee
Heartens Missile's Foes
For Battle on Floor

OUTCOME IS UNCERTAIN

Administration Is Backed on
Its \$793-Million Request
For First 2 Stations

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 27—The Senate Armed Services Committee, by a 10-to-7 vote, today approved the deployment of the Administration's Safeguard missile defense system.

The committee action set the stage for what is expected to be a protracted floor fight next month, with the outcome still uncertain in the closely divided Senate.

Committee approval had been expected on the Administration's request for \$793.5-million to start construction of the first two stations in the antiballistic missile system. It ultimately will have 12 stations and cost nearly \$11-billion, according to current Pentagon estimates.

What was unusual, however, was the sharp division within a committee that normally takes its proposals to the Senate floor with a united front. Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, observed that it was the first time in his 17 years on the committee when there had been such a division and when a minority report would be filed by the committee.

Opponents Heartened

Leaders of the opposition to Safeguard believe their case has been strengthened by the division within the committee. In the forthcoming debate these opponents will find support

from some of the senior members of the committee. Thus Senator John Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, the committee chairman, will find himself in the unusual role of defending the committee's action against some of the senior committee members such as Senator Margaret Chase Smith of Maine, the ranking Republican, and Senator Symington, the third ranking Democrat.

Also regarded as significant was the fact that Senator Howard W. Cannon, Democrat of Nevada, voted against the Administration request. Until the vote, Senator Cannon had been placed by the opposition among the uncommitted on the missile issue.

At this point, the opposition believes it has 49 "hard" votes against Safeguard's deployment, with 46 Senators supporting the Administration and five uncommitted. With Senator Cannon switching from the ranks of the uncommitted, the

Continued on Page 11, Column 1

Continued From Page 1, Col. 1
opposition believes it now commands 50 votes, or one shy of a majority.

On the basis of today's committee action, the opposition may also pick up the vote of Senator Thomas J. McIntyre, Democrat of New Hampshire, who has been regarded as the key Senator on the issue. Senator McIntyre, who abstained from today's vote, was reported to have announced at the closed-door session of the committee that he would vote against the Administration request if his proposed compromise was rejected.

As a compromise, he has proposed that the Administration be given permission to proceed with the installation of radars and computers at the first two sites in Montana and North Dakota but that authority be withheld for deployment of the missiles. His objective has been to have the Senate go on record as being against immediate deployment while still permitting the Army to proceed with field testing of the electronic components of the system.

Senator McIntyre presented his compromise to the committee today but did not press it to a vote when it became apparent he would lose. He informed his colleagues, however, that he intended to offer his plan when the issue reached the Senate floor.

The Administration now believes that it has 51 or 52 Senators favoring Safeguard deployment, with 46 Senators opposed and two or three uncommitted. In line with this nose count, Senator John G. Tower, Republican of Texas, predicted that the pro-missile forces would win by a three-or-four-vote majority.

Not only does the opposition believe the Administration is misjudging its strength but also the attitude of the opponents is hardening as a result of some Administration actions unrelated to the antiballistic missile issue.

In recent days some opposition leaders have been attempting to draft a face-saving compromise for the Administration. Thus, for example, the Senate Majority leader, Mike

Mansfield, Montana Democrat, has been suggesting privately that the deployment funds be voted. However, he wants the spending held up until such time as it is apparent that no progress is being made in strategic arms talks with the Soviet union or that the Soviet missile threat is materializing, as projected by the Pentagon.

See Shift to Right

But this compromise talk among moderate and liberal Democrats and Republicans was reported to be abating in the wake of Administration moves to modify the voting rights law, to relax the school desegregation guidelines and the withdrawal of the proposed nomination of Dr. John H. Knowles as the nation's top medical officer.

Each of these actions was regarded by moderates and liberals who make up the hard core of the opposition to Safeguard as a shift to the right by the Administration. They also view the moves as an over-all indication that President Nixon has no desire to reach a political accommodation with the centrist coalition in the Senate.

As a result, the antiballistic missile issue is becoming involved in the policy split developing between the White House and the centrist group in the Senate. In the process, as one antimissile system strategist put it, "the burden for a compromise is shifting to Nixon."

In the committee, voting for deployment were Senators Stennis, Richard B. Russell, Democrat of Georgia; Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington; Sam J. Ervin Jr., Democrat of North Carolina; Harry F. Byrd Jr., Democrat of Virginia; Strom Thurmond, Republican of South Carolina; Tower; Peter H. Dominick, Republican of Colorado; George Murphy, Republican of California, and Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona.

Opposed were Senators Symington, Cannon, Stephen M. Young, Democrat of Ohio; Daniel K. Inouye, Democrat of Hawaii; Smith; Edward W. Brooke, Republican of Massachusetts, and Richard S. Schweiker, Republican of Pennsylvania.

Senate Committee Formally Requests Money for ABM

By DANA BULLEN
Star Staff Writer

The Senate Armed Services Committee formally called for approval of initial elements of an antiballistic missile system today, while three members of the committee charged that deployment of an ABM system would not improve United States security.

Arguments for and against the ABM—mostly a reiteration of viewpoints that have been publicly debated—were contained in a 70-page report forwarding military procurement authorization requests to the Senate floor.

The over-all military request is for \$20 billion, which represents a cut of nearly \$2 billion from the \$21.9 billion revised budget submitted by Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird.

The figures for specific requests were released last week, but today's report by the committee, as the Senate prepares to launch into prolonged debate over the Nixon administration's safeguard ABM proposed, gave the first official view of the debate within the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The committee, which supported the ABM 10-7, said in the report that the first consideration that led it to back the ABM was a desire to improve President Nixon's position in forthcoming arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union.

"If we unilaterally abandon all deployment of our ABMs, what incentive do we give the Soviets to negotiate with us a limit or a reduction in their ABM deployment?" the report said.

The committee said it had "solid, hard intelligence information" indicating that if the Russians continue to build additional missiles at the present rate by the mid-1970s they can "threaten the effectiveness" of the United States' Minuteman deterrent forces.

"The hard truth is that by the mid-1970s unless we continue to make appropriate decisions... the second strike capability of a large proportion of our strategic deterrent forces will be in doubt."

Three of the 7 committee members who voted against ABM deployment charged in a minority statement that the proposed system is vulnerable to enemy attack and might not work if needed.

In this statement, Stuart Symington, D-Mo.; Stephen M. Young, D-Ohio, and Daniel K. Inouye, D-Hawaii, said that even if the ABM works it will do "practically nothing" in protecting Minuteman sites.

They criticized the Pentagon for refusing to release secret information given committee members which they said shows "conclusively" that a small increase in the number of big Soviet SSs missiles would eliminate any significant gain from an ABM system.

"We now also know that because of our domestic problems and our foreign commitments, we must establish some order of priorities with respect to our resources," they said, adding that existing United States missiles "could destroy the Soviet Union some 50 times over" in the event of an attack.

The four senators who voted against authorizing deployment of the ABM but who did not sign the minority report were Howard W. Cannon, D-Nev.; Edward W. Brooke, R-Mass.; Margaret Chase Smith, R-Maine, and Richard S. Schweiker, R-Pa.

Another senator, Thomas J. McIntyre, D-N.H., in a separate statement, proposed a compromise ABM approach that would permit con-

centrated testing of ABM electronic components at the Montana and North Dakota sites proposed for ABM deployment, but delay such deployment.

The \$20 billion authorization bill now facing the full Senate would allocate \$759 million for initial work on an ABM system. The money would go for procurement of some ABM elements, further research and development and construction of facilities on Kwajalein Island in the Pacific.

The committee, in outlining a number of arguments for going ahead with the ABM, said that failure to begin procurement of long "lead time" items this year would delay initial operational capability scheduled for 1974 for two years until 1976.

The report also emphasized that the authorizations sought for the coming fiscal year are not "an irrevocable commitment" to an ABM system, which, it said, would be subject to annual review by Congress.

Compromise Doubtful

Meanwhile, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield said there does not appear to be much chance of a compromise emerging when the ABM issue is considered on the floor.

Mansfield said it appears likely that the ABM eventually may be voted down.

"It looks as if we'll battle it right down to the wire," Mansfield said. "On that basis, cost prospects for defeating the ABM are good."

The outcome may be in doubt for some weeks, however. Mansfield said the debate could take up the rest of July. "There's a lot of pentup speeches waiting to be delivered," he said.

PRO-ABM BOOK TO BE PUBLISHED

NEW YORK (AP) — A book defending the controversial Safeguard missile defense system will be published July 17 in an attempt to counter what its authors feel is a one-sided debate.

Herman Kahn, director of the Hudson Institute, a "think tank" in Westchester County, said yesterday the book, "Why ABM," would deal with substantive arguments on the need for the antiballistic missile system.

Kahn, interviewed by telephone at his home in Chappaqua, N.Y., said, "We thought it would be good to have a literate discussion that gives the other side." Many of the 12 articles stem from papers written for other publications, he said, and were done by scientists at the institute.

He said he had not been asked by the Nixon administration to write the book.

The authors contend that a light American missile defense system will not frighten the Soviet Union, which has always been defense-minded, Kahn said.

Hill Unit Asks Study Into Bomber 'Threat'

Bomber Threat Is Disputed

By Richard Homan
 Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Armed Services Committee has ordered a thorough Defense Department study to resolve the "wide and sharp differences" between Pentagon and intelligence community assessments of the threat posed to the United States by Soviet bombers.

The Air Force, in testimony before the Committee, outlined a threat much greater than that seen by the national intelligence estimate, a combined product of the intelligence community that relies heavily on information gathered by the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies.

The difference is so great, the Committee said in its report released yesterday, that reliance on Air Force estimates would require funding a vast weapons system while the national intelligence estimate might permit "phasing down" bomber defenses.

See REPORT, A7, Col. 1

REPORT, From A1

For now, the Committee apparently has accepted the estimate of the national intelligence community.

It chopped the Pentagon's requests for research and development funds for AWACS (airborne warning and control system) and an improved interceptor, both part of a beefed-up anti-bomber defense proposed by the Air Force, from \$78.5 million to \$18.2 million.

The Committee said it had decided that "the threat from potential hostile bombers is not sufficiently clear and imminent at this time to justify a full go-ahead on programs which in total could ultimately involve expenditures of billions of dollars."

The cuts were part of a \$2 billion reduction made by the Committee in the Pentagon's \$22 billion proposed budget for weapons procurement and research. The bill, which includes \$759.1 million for initial deployment of the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system, went to the Senate floor yesterday.

Though much of the testimony dealing with assessments of the Soviet bomber

threat is censored for security reasons, the major disagreements appear to be over the role of the 750 Soviet medium bombers, whether Russia is developing a new long-range bomber and whether its heavy bomber inventory will decline.

"Our study of the bomber defense issue revealed a wide and sharp difference between the national intelligence estimate and the Air Force with respect to the gravity of the Soviet manned bomber threat," the Committee report said.

"The question also arose as to whether it is not possible to effect some economies by phasing down some portions of existing bomber defenses if the present and future threat is as limited as portrayed by the NIE."

According to Committee Chairman John C. Stennis (D Miss.), the national intelligence estimate does not consider the 750 medium bombers a threat to the continental United States, except Alaska.

Air Force Secretary Robert C. Seamans Jr. Testified, however, "These Soviet aircraft are a threat both to our allies and to the continental United States."

Excerpts From Majority and Minority Reports by Senate Committee on Safeguard

Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, July 7—The Senate Armed Services Committee today issued its majority and minority reports on the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system.

Majority Views

Following are the considerations which lead the majority of the committee to support the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system as proposed for authorization in fiscal year 1970.

(1)

On the eve of what is hoped will be meaningful discussions with the Russians on the limitations of strategic arms, the President of the United States will be in a stronger position with the approval of partial funding of the phase I deployment as the bill provides rather than just to continue the program essentially in a research and development posture.

President Nixon has asked the Congress not to abandon work on the deployment of an antiballistic missile system but to proceed with it.

He said: "I believe it is essential for the national security, and it is essential to avoid putting an American President, either this President or the next President, in the position where the United States would be second rather than first, or at least equal to any potential enemy."

Coming Talks Cited

The President believes that the backing of the Congress on his Safeguard program would strengthen his hand in the forthcoming negotiations with the Soviet Union on the limitation of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. If we unilaterally abandon all deployment of our ABMs, what incentive does it give the Soviet to negotiate with us a limit or reduction in their ABM deployment if American negotiators are confronted with a situation where the Soviet negotiators believe time is running on the Soviet side, our negotiators would be up against very adverse odds.

To arrive at successful, reciprocal, and mutually acceptable agreements on limiting both offensive and defensive nuclear systems will involve rigorous bargaining by Moscow for relative advantage and will, at best, be enormously difficult. We think the Congress can best help the President and his negotiating team in very important negotiations by approving the proposed 1970 program.

(2)

It is not believed that the procurement program proposed for fiscal year 1970 should jeopardize talks with Soviet Russia or cause an escalation of the arms race. No evidence has been presented that the Soviet Union views the problem in this regard. Moreover, it should be noted that since last summer when the antiballistic missile issue became prominent in both the United States and Soviet Russia, the Soviets have—

(1) Continued to deploy the SS-9, SS-11, and new solid propellant ICBMs;

(2) Flight tested a multiple re-entry vehicle payload on the SS-9;

(3) Continued production of missile-firing subs;

(4) Initiated tests on the next generation of ABMs;

(5) Continued deployment of the Tallinn and Moscow defensive systems;

(6) Continued both quantitative and qualitative improvements in their air defense.

It should be emphasized that there are no threats to these talks. If there is to be no deployment either before or during possible protracted negotiations, the United States would then be in a serious position both from the standpoint of negotiating position and our deterrent forces.

(3)

The need for an antiballistic missile system must be viewed within the context of all of our defense elements which underlie our policy of nuclear deterrence. This retaliatory force is

based on a substantial number of vehicles of several quite different types—Minuteman, bombers, and Polaris/Poseidon—with each system having its own kind of protection. The system has different limitations, is subject to varied uncertainties, and requires distinct modes of attack. Each type must be protected, so as to insure no easy defeat of our system by an enemy. It must be of serious concern therefore if any part of our deterrent mixture is adversely affected by changing adverse forces and technologies.

We have solid hard intelligence information that the Soviet Union has either in operation or under construction at least 230 SS-9 ICBMs. If the Soviets continue to build additional missiles at the same rate as in the past several years, by the mid-1970's they will be in a position to assess the effectiveness of our Minuteman forces. Based on past accomplishments and their potential, it is assumed that each missile will be able to contain three separate warheads.

(4)

The significance of the headline element should be recognized. If the measured progress proposed for fiscal year 1970 is not approved—that is, if production is delayed by 1 year—the initial operational capability now scheduled for 1974 will be delayed for 2 years until 1976.

The bar must be raised by the breakdown in production momentum and the time consumed in rebuilding production lines.

(5)

Reputable scientists have testified that the system will not operate effectively due to its complexity while other scientists have testified that despite the complex nature of the Safeguard system, it can be anticipated that the technical problems can be resolved in order for the system to become operationally effective.

The testing and design work on both the missile, the radar components, and the computers so far have not indicated that there are insurmountable technological problems confronting the Safeguard system. It is prudent that any decision in this question be resolved in favor of confidence in the system.

(6)

While there may be possible alternatives to the construction of the Safeguard system such as adding to our offensive forces or superhardening the missile sites, the prudent course is not to abandon the Safeguard system at this time and proceed with other alternatives. To proceed with additional offensive forces would probably provide a real threat in the escalation of the arms race.


Moreover, there is some doubt as to whether in the long run, time and funds would be saved with this alternative. There is a program at the present time for development work in superhardening the missile sites. It is believed, however, that this would be a substitute for an antiballistic missile system with sufficient accuracy, even hardened sites are vulnerable.

It is believed that the Safeguard system will provide the Minuteman with sufficient protection to make it a credible deterrent. Adversely, any system can be saturated. If circumstances change in the years ahead indicating this probability to the antiballistic missile system, then other alternatives must be considered either in the form of additional ABMs or radars or additional offensive missiles or some other course of action.


(7)

It should be emphasized that the fiscal year 1970 authorization for funding contained in this bill is not an irrevocable commitment to the Safeguard system. The limited degree to which the system is funded has already been mentioned. This program will be subject to the annual review and control by the Congress and will be subject to at least two votes in both the House and the Senate in the form of authorization and appropriation legislation.

The committee majority was made up of Democrats



Senator John C. Stennis



Senator Stuart Symington

phase I program or the initiation and completion of the 10-site phase 2. Each year the Congress will have the opportunity to review intelligence data and the threat to our forces. After such review the Congress can then be in a position to assess whether or not under all the circumstances the Safeguard system be continued.

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The committee majority was made up of Democrats

John Stennis of Mississippi, the chairman, Richard B. Russell of Georgia, Henry M. Jackson of Washington, Sam J. Ervin of North Carolina, Howard W. Cannon of Nevada and Harry F. Byrd Jr. of Virginia, Democrats, plus Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, John G. Tower of Texas, Peter H. Dominick of Colorado, and Henry Caddwater of Arizona, Republicans.

(12)

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successfully together in that almost instantaneous manner which would be necessary in case of sudden attack; and there is even more reason to doubt that the computer, which has been neither built nor tested, and which is admittedly far more complicated than any computer ever used, would they operate properly when called upon to do so.

(16)

Not Tested as a Whole

Finally, it is logical to consider whether, even if these three separate components would operate properly as separate units, would they operate when combined. For obvious reasons, the testing of any joint operation has not been possible.

The second reason is the vulnerability of the system. Because the resistance strength (the life of the MSR) is less than 10 per cent of the strength of the missile site in its present conformation, that it is vulnerable even to the least lethal, less accurate Soviet SS-11 missile, of which the Soviets have hundreds more than they have SS-9's.

Because the MSR radar is designed to guide both Safeguard missiles to their targets, if it is knocked out the entire Safeguard system would be blinded and therefore worthless.

The third reason is the relative ease by which the Soviet Union could overcome any improvement in our defenses which could result from the deployment of Safeguard. As mentioned previously, objective critics predict that its unprecedentedly complicated electronic system may not function under sudden attack (in which case, if this is the basket in which we have placed our eggs, our security would be involved).

(17)

Little Protection Found

What we do assert, however, is that even if Safeguard works perfectly as designed, it will do practically nothing in protecting Minuteman sites.

The magnitude of the asserted threat has been declassified, but the Defense Department has consistently refused to release classified information presented to the committee which to us presents conclusively that a small

increase in Soviet SS-9 missile production would eliminate any significant protection by this system even if it worked perfectly.

In this connection, one of the universally respected experts in this field, Dr. Wolf Panofsky, in an address last month stated: "If the threat to Minuteman grows at the rate projected by the Defense Department, and if Minuteman became vulnerable at a certain time several years hence, then if the Safeguard system were installed and if it functioned perfectly, then the Minuteman would be just as vulnerable as before only a few months later."

Presidents Praised

During the past 11 years, although there has been nothing comparable to what is going on today, there nevertheless was tremendous pressure from the Defense Department and some people in industry to install the various ABM systems of the past; and it is now admitted that the wisdom of Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy in refusing to bow to those pressures prevented this Government from wasting many billions of dollars.

Later the previously abandoned elements of the Nike-Zeus and the Nike X systems were pooled together to form a "thin" city defense against the Chinese. It was named Sentinel. Still later, however, the cities rebelled against this untended system with all the questionable premises listed above.

Thereupon the name of the system was changed to Safeguard, and its mission changed from city defense to the defense of missile sites.

In summary, despite the heavy demands by our limited resources—demands identical to poverty, health, education, and foreign commitments—if we believed

that the Safeguard system would contribute in any substantial fashion to the security of the United States, we would recommend its deployment. We do not so believe, however.

We do believe that any primary defense against the threat of a nuclear attack lies in our deterrent capability. In this connection, we believe that with our Polaris fleet, our land-based ICBMs, our strategic bombers, and the thousands of additional nuclear warheads we have at sea and abroad, if we were attacked we could destroy the Soviet Union some 50 times over.

Under these circumstances, as the number of nations with nuclear weapons continues to grow, it would be unfortunate indeed if an ABM deployment on our part had a negative effect on arms control discussions. It would also appear clear that if we proceed with this system, the Soviet Union will respond by increasing its offensive strength so as to negate any possible advantage which might be derived from said Safeguard deployment. The result could only be a further escalation of the arms race.

It is for these reasons that we oppose deployment of the Safeguard system at this time.

STUART M. YOUNG
 DAVEN K. INOUÉ

Matter of Priorities

It is our considered opinion that, except in one respect, the situation which was faced up to by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy is the same situation we face today, as the Congress and the people weigh the merit of employing this proposed Safeguard system. That exception has to do with our not unlimited re-